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THE MARKET PRICE, SURPLUS , NET EARNINGS,
AND DIVIDENDS OF COMMON STOCKS
I. INTRODUCTION
The theory of the capitalization of income is not only ad-
vanced by economists, but it is also applied by investors and
speculators. In Irving Pisher's "Elementary Principles of Econ-
omics" 1 we have the following statement: "Income is derived from
capital-goods. But the value of the income is not derived from
the value of those capital goods. On the contrary, the value of
the capital is derived from the value of the income. Not until
we know how much income an item of capital will bring us can we
set any valuation on that capital at all. This derivation of
capital-value from income-value is called 'capitalizing income',
or 'discounting income.'" To illustrate, let us suppose that the
income to be gained from an industry is |6,000 and that money is
worth six per cent. Then the business will be valued at $100,000.
One well-known application of the theory by investors and
speculators is in the valuation of stocks. It is common to hear
a speculator say that a certain stock is earning five per cent,
and that it should therefore sell at about 90. He has arrived at
this quotation thru multiplying the rate of five per cent by 18;
that is, by capitalizing at five and one-half per cent. He will
explain the fact that a stock is selling at a higher rate than its
xp. 107.
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present earnings admit by stating that earnings will be more in
the future--by capitalizing future earning power. He will jus-
tify a relatively low quotation by the explanation that the earn-
ings upon this stock will probably decrease in the future.
While the capitalization of income theory is valid from the
theoretical standpoint, difficulties are encountered in its prac-
tical application. In the valuation of bonds the theory can be
applied very exactly. It can also be used with regard to pre-
ferred stocks. However, in Placing a value upon common stocks,
particular objections are to be found in its use. There are
other factors by which the prices of common stocks are influenced.
As a matter of fact, it is not a particularly difficult mat-
ter to enumerate a large number of causes that affect the prices
of common stocks. They may be classified broadly into two main
divisions. Of these the first may be termed external causes.
This class includes those factors which influence alike the t>rice
of stocks of all industries or the various units of any one indus-
try. Such factors are the rate of interest, general monetary
conditions, and trade conditions. The second class comprises
what are called internal causes. In this division are embraced
those factors which affect only one unit of an industry, not the
industry taken as a whole. Among these factors are the charac-
ter of the management, prospects of the business, manipulation of
the stock, rate of earnings, dividends, and the accumulated sur-
plus of the stock. To illustrate the difference between these
two sets of causes—the external and internal--suppose a drop in
the price of a stock is caused by a general rise in interest rates
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Then we say that an external cause has been at work. If, however,
the drop has been brought about by a fall in the dividend rate
while the interest rate in the community has remained constant,
the drop has been caused by an internal cause.
The determination of the particular causes that are at work
and of their relative potency is the source of the main difficulty.
It is to consider these questions that the present investigation is
made. The problem is, in brief, to try to eliminate as far as
possible all causes except those of dividends, earnings, and sur-
plus, and then to determine the relative effect of these three
factors
.
Thus the purpose of the investigation is two-fold. It is:
1. To collect and tabulate statistical data by means of
observations on a number of common stocks for a term of years on
the prices of these stocks, and their accompanying surpluses,
earnings, and dividends.
2. To make use of such data to discover, if possible, how
close a relation may be said, in general, to exist between market
price and a) surplus b) net earnings applicable to dividends on
oommon stock and c) dividends on the common stock.
The first object is in a measure incidental to the second,
and is of course essential to any determination of the second.
Scope
The work includes twenty-three well-known common stocks, and
covers a period of ten years for each stock, starting in 1904 or
1905, and ending in 1913 or 1914. The stocks selected embrace
twelve railroads, two other public utilities, and nine industrials.
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All are listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Most of the
stocks are included in the list from which Babson makes his
Barometer of Prices. If it cannot be urged that the selection
made is the best possible for the results desired, it can at least
be contended that it is a fairly good one.
Sources of Data
Market prices were gathered from the Monthly Bank and
Quotation Supplement of the Commercial and Financial Chronicle.
All other data were procured from the reports of the several
corporations in Moody's Manual of Corporations. These observa-
tions were compared with the corresponding figures shown in the
Manual of Statistics, and any discrepancies investigated.
Definitions
By market price, as used in this paper, we mean the average
price of the stock for the year to which the earnings and dividends
quoted apply. The average is the simple arithmetic mean of the
twenty-four high and low prices taken from the monthly -price quo-
tations. Two issues of the Supplement to the Commercial Chron-
icle (August, 1907 and May, 1911) are not at hand, and the prices
for these years are computed on the basis of twenty-two observa-
tions. If the par value of a stock is other than £100, the price
is reduced to that basis. An average taken in the manner before
described can give only an approximate mean value of the prices
of the stock, but it is sufficiently accurate for the purposes of
the paper.
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Dividends, as we use the word, include only dividends on the
common stock for the fiscal year, and are a ratio of the amount
of dividends to the total amount of common stock outstanding.
As we apply the term in the present paper, net earnings
applicable to common dividends are the sum of dividends on the
common stock for the fiscal year, plus any residue, divided by the
total common stock. The residue includes surplus for the year,
and all other items which are properly appropriations of profit,
but excludes items which are charges against profits. If a def-
icit results after paying dividends, such a deficit is deducted
instead of added. It may be that dividends upon preferred stock,
which must be paid before any sum is applicable to dividends upon
the common stock, are not declared. In such a case the amount of
these dividends is also subtracted. Thus one sees that it is
possible to secure a negative net earning. This concept may be
criticised as a mathematical abstraction, but it has its justifi-
cation, as will be shown later. The amount of the net earnings
is obtained from the income account of the fiscal year. Due to
the fact that the application of accounting science has not reached
a state of uniformity, it is to be expected that some errors in
reporting and observing earnings may result. It is to be hoped,
however, that the data were gathered with sufficient care as to
reduce the error to a minimum.
For present purposes surplus may be defined as the ratio of
the accumulated net earnings minus the dividends, since the cor-
poration was organized, to the total common stock outstanding.
The surplus is taken from the balance sheet of the corporation.
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and includes, as do the net earnings, all amounts which are proper
ly appropriations of profits. Thus it is susceptible to the same
sources of error as are the net earnings. It would seem fund-
amental from our definitions of earnings and surplus that the
increase in surplus for each year should be the amount of the
net earnings minus the dividends, but this is not always the case.
This discrepancy may have resulted 1) from an increase of capital
stock either by a sale of stock or thru a stock dividend or 2)
from various adjustments and accounting procedures not carried
thru the income account.
Prom these definitions it can be seen that all the items are
ratios to the total value at par of the common stock. Price is
a ratio of the market value of the stock, dividends of the divided
earnings, earnings of the actual profit, and surplus of the accu-
mulated profits. For this reason it would seem that all are
comparable, and may be properly plotted on the same graphs, and to
the same scale.
Graphs
The graphical method is used thruout the discussion. All
factors—earnings, dividends, surplus, and price of each stock--
are plotted upon the same graph. The same scale is used thruout,
with one important exception. In the case of those stocks whose
price has been above 100, the scale of the price is reduced to
one-half that of the other observations. This must be carefully
noted, not only because of its effect upon the relative position
of the market price with regard to earnings, dividends, and sur-
plus, but also because of the fact that it smooths the curve some-
what, and makes less noticeable the price fluctuations. Those
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cases in which a reduction in the price scale is made can be
easily recognized by the fact that an additional perpendicular
scale is shown. Of the two scales the left refers to the price,
while the right applies to the other three factors.
Grouping
In Moody's Manual of Corporations there are three main
groups—Railroads, Industrials, and Public Utilities. Such a
division is not strictly logical. A railroad is as much a public
utility as any other kind of a public-service corporation. In the
present paper the grouping of Moody is followed in the main, but
the class "Public Utilities'' is changed to "Other Public Utilities.
We will now proceed to discuss briefly the corporations in these
three groups, starting with the railroads, proceeding to the other
public utilities, and ending with the industrials.
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II. RAILROADS
It was not an easy matter to decide upon which railroads to
include in the investigation. There are so many large and im-
portant railway systems in this country, that it was impossible,
because of the limitations of time, to include them all, and it
was something of a problem to select those which would be repre-
sentative, and which would exhibit the general trend of the rail-
way movement. Twelve stocks were finally selected. The list
includes railways widely separated geographically, and greatly
varied financially. There are those roads whose territory in-
cludes our Western and Pacific states, like Atchison, Topeka, and
Santa Fe, and Eastern roads like Chesapeake and Ohio; there are
such ultra-conservative roads as Pennsylvania, and such wildly-
managed systems as Hew York, New Haven and Hartford; there are such
eminently successful roads as Union Pacific, and those which, like
Erie, have not paid a dividend on their common stock during the
entire interval.
Sach stock is considered separately, incidental comparisons
are made with others of similar nature, and then a few general
remarks are made from a consideration of all the stocks taken
together.
Pennsylvania Rai lro ad Company
Pennsylvania is almost a household word for conservatism.
It is the road which was financed by "straight line" methods.
Looking at its diagram (figure 1) one sees that it has earner? its
reputation for conservatism. During the ten year neriod its div-

1904- 5 IS
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idend rate fluctuated only one per cent, and during this time its
earnings never varied more than from two to four per cent above the
dividends. Its surplus, however, calls for some explanation. Until
1910 it did not increase with the net earnings as it should accord-
ing to our fundamental definition. In 1910 it rose suddenly. It
was in this year that the Pennsylvania road adopted the uniform
system of accounting for railroads prescribed by the Interstate
Commerce Commission. Prior to that time Pennsylvania had, by
its "straight line" methods, charged to revenue items of improve-
ment and additions, which, while they might not add immediately
to the earning power of the company, yet increased the actual cost
of the assets. The Commission's form of accounting prescribed a
showing of such improvements and additions on the balance sheet.
Pennsylvania, with New York Central, a discussion of which
follows, is unique among the railroads in that its fiscal year
ends on December 31 instead of June 30. It at present issues two
reports, one upon December 31, which is made for its stockholders,
and one on June 30, which is furnished for the Interstate Commerce
Commission. This fact is mentioned because of the very marked
effect it had at one time upon the market price. As will be
remembered, the Panic of 1907 began in October, and abated in the
Spring of the next year. Thus the price of Pennsylvania, whose
fiscal year ends on December 31, felt the effect of the Panic
during two years--1907 and 1908—as is shown in the diagram.
Aside from these two years the price of the stock shows a fairly
constant downward trend. This, too, is in direct opposition to
the sudden rise in surplus and a fairly constant dividend and
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earning rate. We roust, however, remember the explanation for
the increase in surolus, and recall that it came about more thru
a change in accounting methods than by an actual increase. Also,
upon examination, we see that there has been a one per cent dro-o
in dividends after 1908, since which time the principal drop has
occurred. The tendency, however, with such stable dividends and
earnings, indicates the working of external causes.
Hew York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company
Hew York Central is usually considered with Pennsylvania.
These roads are the country's two largest railway systems. They
cover nearly the same territory, and their policies have been
somewhat similar. New York Central has not, however, earned as
much per share of common stock, nor declared as large dividends
as has Pennsylvania. Its dividends have been only five T>er cent
except in 1907 and 1910, in which years they were six per cent
(figure 2). It is interesting to note how little the dividends
and earnings of these two roads changed in 1907, although the
Panic caused a great drop in their prices. Earnings of New York
Central do not show the margin over dividends that is shown by
those of Pennsylvania. At no time have they been more than two
and one-fourth per cent above dividends, and during one year they
nearly coincided. Furthermore, the surplus of New York Central
has not grown. The road has not been financed by "straight line"
methods to the extent of Pennsylvania. The price of New York
Central has fluctuated rather widely. One sees a rather close
correspondence to a drop in earnings and dividends in 1908, and
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a remarkable rise of price with a rise in earnings in 1909.
Since then earnings have fallen off somewhat, and price has
dropped. Uor was it revived in 1910 by a one per cent rise in
the rate of dividends. As in the case of Pennsylvania, the main
downward tendency must have been caused by external conditions.
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company
Baltimore and Ohio (figure 3) is another railroad which has
maintained a very constant dividend rate for the years considered.
Its earnings have, however, fluctuated rather widely, and during
two years dividends exceeded the earnings. Surplus, like that
of Pennsylvania, jumped suddenly in 1910, but with the exception
of that year accords fairly closely with earnings. Taken over
the term of years the price seems to have been on about a constant
level, but it has fluctuated widely during the interval. Baltimore
and Ohio is the first of our stocks in which the effect of the
Panic of 1907 is shown principally in the price of the stock in
the year 1908 alone. This is readily explained when we consider
that the fiscal year ends on June 30, and 1908 will then include
the period from July 1, 1907, to June 30, 1908. The orice of
Baltimore and Ohio has followed in every year the rise and fall
of earnings. This stock is especially valuable in our investi-
gation, since we know that price fluctuations have not followed
dividends, which have remained at six per cent since 1906.
Union Pacific Railroad Company
Judging from dividends, surplus, and earnings, Union Pacific
(figure 4) is one of the best managed and most profitable roads
we have to consider. Its dividends rose from four and one-half
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per cent in 1905, to ten per cent in 1907, which rate was main-
tained until 1914, when a reduction of one per cent was made.
Earnings during the ten year period have varied from eleven and
one-half to nineteen per cent. Surplus would at first sight
seem to be somewhat of a mystery. There are three years which
we must explain--1911, 1913, and 1914. Surplus increased stead-
ily until 1911, in which year it rose suddenly. Union Pacific
in this year made a revaluation of its assets, which caused the
increase. In 1912 surplus reached its pinnacle, and during the
next two years dropped greatly. In 1913 the Union Pacific was
compelled to effect its dissolution from the Southern Pacific.
In so doing, it distributed from its surplus a sum of $33.30 per
share in addition to an exchange of Southern Pacific stock for
stock in Baltimore and Ohio, and also as compensation for a con-
templated reduction in the rate of dividends. The drop of the
next year was caused by an extensive reserve which was created
for "Depreciation of Securities". It may be that this reserve is
more in the nature of surplus, but upon this we cannot pass judg-
ment. The price of Union Pacific has varied from 114 to 193.5.
Such a wide fluctuation does not seem to be justified by the con-
stant dividend rate in the period following 1907. Prices in this
case appear to follow in a general way the accumulation of surplus
and also to a considerable extent the rate of earnings. I believe
that we must, however, in this case guard against the assumption
of too close a relationship, as the great amount of speculation
in Union Pacific must have influenced its price.
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flew York, New Haven, and Hartford Railroad Company
The story of the Hew York, Hew Haven, and Hartford Railroad
is too well known to need much discussion. Also a study of the
accompanying graph (figure 5) will explain the facts clearer than
words can tell. Here we see a dividend rate kept at eight per
cent until 1913, earnings fluctuating from four per cent above to
three ner cent below dividends, and an ever-decreasing surplus, due
at first mainly to additional issues of stock. Then in 1913 and
1914 the true conditions were known and exposed, earnings dropped
from thirteen per cent down to nearly nothing, dividends fell from
eight per cent to one and one-half per cent, and surplus dropped
from nineteen and one-half per cent to one per cent. Accompany-
ing these losses we see a sensational fall in price. It dropped
from an average of 202 to 78. It has, however, followed rather
closely the earnings as reported in the income accounts for the
various years.
Illinois Central Railroad Company
Illinois Central is of especial interest since it is the most
important road in the State of Illinois. It has been a very
constant dividend payer up to 1913 (figure 6), when its rate was
lowered from seven per cent to six per cent, and in the next year
to five per cent. As far as earnings are concerned it has shown
considerable fluctuation, and during 1912 earnings were four per
cent below dividends. It has not been able to accumulate any
considerable surplus. The price of the stock has shown a very
decided downward trend, and its fluctuations cannot be said, until
1913, to accord in any respect to earnings, dividends, or surplus.
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In 1913 the price declined, which probably was due principally to
a conviction upon the part of speculators that the decline in
dividends would be permanent.
northern Pacific Railway Company
The rate of dividends of northern Pacific (figure 7) has
remained at seven per cent every year that was considered. Al-
though its earnings show a general decline, they have, neverthe-
less, remained from one to seven per cent above dividends. There
have been two violent changes in surplus, the first in 1907, «-hich
must have been brought about by a change in accounting procedure,
and the second in 1909, in which year an additional issue of
stock was made. In 1905 the price of the stock was not quoted,
as it was in the hands of the Northern Securities Company. This
latter company was forced to dissolve, and beginning in 1906 we
have quotations for northern Pacific. The price of 205 follow-
ing the dissolution seems to be out of proportion to its earnings
and dividends. From that time the price showed a more or less
due to
steady decline. This may be/NmoreAa drop to its normal value
than to any specific cause, although it does follow to a consid-
erable extent the fall in the rate of earnings.
Reading Company
The Reading Company, as it is here shown (figure 8) is a
consolidation of three corporat ions--the Reading Company, Phil-
adelphia and Reading Railway Company, and the Philadelphia and
Reading Coal and Iron Company. Its dividends show a steady rise
from one and one-half per cent in 1905 to eight per cent in 1914.
Its earnings were rather constant until 1913, when they exhibited
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a remarkable rise to seventeen per cent, with an immediate dror>
in 1914 to eight per cent. In general earnings have not increased
to the extent of dividends, and this fact indicates some change
in the policy of the company. Surplus has risen steadily, and
has corresponded very closely to the value we would expect. The
price of Reading presents a wide range of fluctuation, but it has
had a steady upward trend. As both surplus and dividends have
increased it is impossible to determine what portion of the rise
to ascribe to each.
Chicago , Milwaukee . and St . Paul Rai lway Company
Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul is a railroad whose finan-
cial condition does not appear, from a study of its graph (figure
9) to have improved during the period we have to consider. Its
dividends were seven per cent until 1912, when they fell to five
per cent, at which point they remained during the remainder of the
time considered. Until 1912 the earnings of the St. Paul road
were considerably above dividends, being as high as seventeen
per cent (1906). In 1912, however, dividends and earnings drop-
ped to the low level of one per cent, or four per cent below div-
idends. In 1913 an increase to nine per cent was made, but in
1914 earnings dropped to about six per cent. The decreasing sur-
plus of the road looks strange in view of its earnings, but during
the period various increases in stock were made, which acted to
increase the net capital, but to decrease the surplus per share of
stock. The price of the St. Paul road has fallen very consider-
ably since 1905. In that year it was quoted at 170, and rose to
179 the next year. In 1908 the usual low point occurred, with a
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recovery the next year. After 1909 the general trend has been
very noticeably downward, and in 1914 the lowest point of 102
was reached. The rise and fall of price and earnings seem in
the main to be coincident.
Srie Railroad Company
If we are to judge by its graph (figure 10) the Erie Rail-
road has been the least successful of all the roads which we have
to consider. During the entire period from 1905 to 1914 it did
not declare a dividend upon its common stock. Its net earnings
started at one and one-half per cent in 1906, rose to two r>er
cent in 1907, and in 1908 sank to the low level of a negative
three per cent. We have before explainer" how a negative net
earning may come about. In this case it was due partly to an
excess of expenses over revenue, and partly to a failure to pay
a four per cent dividend upon both the first and second preferred
stock. If we must stop when we get to zero and merely state
that a corporation has earned nothing, we have not pictured the
true state of affairs. A corporation in which a deficit results
from the year's operations has gone thru a worse year than one
which has come out even. In the graphical method a deficit in
net earnings is very well shown where the curve falls below the
zero line. After 1908 net earnings increased somewhat, but
never to more than five per cent, and ag$in fell below the zero
line in 1914. After 1907 no dividends were paid on the prefer-
red stocks, which decreased the net amount of the earnings. While
dividends on the preferred stock are not a direct liability of
the company, and are not cumulative, nevertheless they must be
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peid before any of the earnings of the current year are applicable
to dividends upon the common stock, and for this reason they are
deducted. The surplus of the Erie road does not seem in several
instances to have followed the net earnings. It increased at
altogether too rapid a rate. Part of this we may explain by the
fact that the amount of prefer red dividends is not deducted from
the surplus, and the rest we must ascribe to adjustments which
were not passed thru the income account.
The price of Erie stock has not varied as widely as that of
some of the other roads. It reached a high point of 46|- in 1906,
and a low quotation of 18 in 1908. After this year it fluctuated
in the neighborhood of 30. ItB changes have followed earnings
rather closely in the main, but evidently not surplus, since we
see a fast-increasing item of surplus, while price remained at a
stationary level.
Chesapeake and Ohio Hailroad Company
Chesapeake and Ohio (figure 11) appears to have been a more
profitable road than Erie, but its dividend and earning rates have
been in nowise phenomenal. Until 1909 it declared only a yearly
one per cent dividend. In that year the rate was increased to
two per cent, and in 1911 to four per cent. Earnings have at no
time been below dividends, and have ranged from as low as three
per cent up as high as ten per cent. In a few instances the
item of surplus has not followed earnings very closely. The road
appears to have made various adjustments thru the surplus account
which it has not passed thru the income account. The net increase
in surplus has been only from one per cent in 1905 to seven per
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cent in 1914. As far as price is concerned two periods are to be
noted. The first extended to 1910 t and during it an upward trend,
with the exception of the year 1908, prevailed. After 1910 the
urice fell from the high level of 84 down to 57 in 1914. In most
cases the price fluctuations have followed very closely the changes
in the rate of earnings.
Atchison, Topeka, and Santa ffe Rai lway Company
A consideration of Atchison, Tooeka, and Santa Fe (figure 12)
ends our study of the individual railroads. The Atchison road
appears to have been quite uniformly successful during the ten
years we have to consider. Its dividend rate was four oer cent
in 1905, and was increased to five and one-half per cent in 1906.
In 1907 it was lowered to five per cent, but was raised to six r>er
cent in 1910, at which level it remained. Earnings during the
entire interval were never less than one and one-half per cent
above dividends, and in 1907 reached the high mark of fifteen ner
cent. Surplus during the period from 1905 to 1908 remained
practically stationary, due to the policy adopted by the Atchison
road of charging betterments to revenue, which items were not shown
on the balance sheet. After 1908 surplus rose with earnings,
except in 1910, when a considerable increase in the amount of stock
was made. As with Chesapeake and Ohio, two price periods are to
be observed. The first extended to 1910, and in it a gain from
84 to 116 was made. The price in 1908 was only 79, but is plain-
ly a break in the general tendency. After 1910 the level of
prices fell, and in 1914 the quotation was only 95^.
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Hailroads in General
One cannot draw any very intelligent conclusions as tc rail-
roads in general from a consideration of twelve railway systems.
Of course these roads, as we have pointed out before, are large,
and are representative to a certain extent. Yet the majority are
of that group which may be termed "successful". We have not in-
cluded such large and ill-fated systems as Chicago, Rock Island,
and Pacific, or Wabash, or St. Louis and San Francisco. One may
argue, however, that a discussion of the successful and moderately
successful roads is all that is necessary, since our object is a
comparison of price with earnings, dividends, and surplus. Nat-
urally no very adequate comparison is provided where there are no
dividends, -/here the amount of earnings is negligible, and where
surplus is a negative quantity known as deficiency. Nevertheless,
from twelve railroads, we can at least point out a few general
tendencies
.
First, as to dividends, the railroads have maintained a fairly
constant rate. Furthermore, they have seemed to try to keep up
this rate longer than earnings justify. We see in a number of
cases the curve of earnings fall below the curve of dividends.
Then a few years later a drop in the dividend rate occurs. This
appears to be an attempt to maintain the price at an artificial
level.
Second, earnings do not fluctuate as widely as one might ex-
pect. There seems to be some drop in the Panic year of 1907-1908,
but not a remarkable fall. There is some tendency to a fall in
earnings of most of the roads during the last few years, but
whether because of a disproportionate increase in capital stock, a
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more adequate provision for depreciation, or a decrease in traf-
fic rates, it is not for us to say.
Third, the item of surplus is one of which we can generalize
very little. Its amount seems to be affected in some cases by
the new accounting procedure prescribed by the Interstate Commerce
Commission. Some of the roads have used up their surplus to pay
dividends, or its relative size has been decreased thru addition-
al stock issues. In one case a stock dividend was declared out
of surplus. Some roads have adopted a conservative policy and
have piled up their surplus for the betterment of the road. There
has been little uniformity, however, and we cannot say what has
been the general tendency.
Fourth, price fluctuations are remarkable because of their
size and trend. We expect the prices of the speculative roads
to vary widely during the period, but one would suppose that thf
prices cf the more conservative would not fluctuate so widely.
The prices of all the stocks of course drop greatly during the
Panic, which, as we have shown, affected the railroads (with two
exceptions) in 1908 principally, because of the period of their
fiscal year. Aside from this, we cannot say that in general there-
has been any marked uniformity. Six roads have shown a constant
downward trend in price, one has tended upward, one has remained
at a stationary level, and four show first a rising and then a
falling tendency. The violence of the price fluctuations leads
to one very natural question--can the common stocks of any rail-
roads be placed in the investment class?
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III. OTHER PUBLIC UTILITIES
Only two public utilities, exclusive of the railroads, were
selected. They are the American Telephone and Telegraph Company
and People's Gas Light and Coke Company of Chicago. These two
corporations are representative of the group, and time does not
permit further examples of a class which is not relatively as
important as the railroads or industrials.
Public utilities are generally supposed to be as conservative
an investment as any common stocks, since their earnings are gen-
erally fairly constant, and their price fluctuations small. As
far as earnings and dividends are concerned, the investigation
seems to bear out this supposition. With regard to price, how-
ever, even these two stocks show considerable fluctuation.
American Telephone and Telegraph Company
The dividends of American Telephone and Telegraph (figure 13)
have varied only one -half per cent in ten years --from seven and
one-half per cent to eight per cent. During the interval earn-
ings also have shown little change. At all times they have been
from one-half to one and one-half per cent above dividend's.
Surplus has, however, behaved in a different manner. It rose
steadily with earnings until 1909, when it jumped from ten per
cent to eighteen per cent. This may be explained as a reval-
uation caused by a change in the manner of presenting reports.
In the other years, except 1911, surplus rose as one would expect.
In this year a considerable issue of stock was made, which accounts
for the decrease in surplus. The price of American Telephone
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and Telegraph does not look quite as conservative as do earnings,
dividends, and surplus. Of course we see the effects of the
Panic in 1967 and 1908, by a marked drop. With the exception of
these two years the price has varied about 14 points --from 129
to 143. Its general trend has been slightly upward, and that
with no increase in either dividends or earnings, but a gradual
piling up of surplus.
People's Gas Light and Coke Company
People's Gas Light and Coke Company (figure 14) seems to be
almost as conservative a stock as the American Telephone and
Telegraph. Its dividends have only varied from five to seven
and one-fourth per cent in the ten years. During all this time
earnings have shown a comfortable margin over the dividends. The
surplus of People's Gas perhaps shows a closer correspondence to
earnings than does the surplus of any other stock recorded. Its
price has fluctuated a little more widely than that of American
Telephone and Telegraph. From 99 in 1904 to 123 in 1905 is a
considerable rise. During 1907 and 1908 we see as usual the
effects of the Panic, and in the succeeding years, while th^re
was an unward tendency, the high point of 1906 was not reached.



-23-
IV. INDUSTRIALS
Our list of industrials is not a long one, including as it
does only nine corporations. All of these are t however, extremely
large companies, and several, such as the United States Steel
Corporation, have played an important part in our recent financial
and industrial development. As a class, the industrials are
considered more speculative than the other two groups, and although
we have not taken enough examples to furnish conclusive evidence
on this point, the cases we have considered seem to bear out this
supposition. The industrials which we have investigated seem
subject to wider fluctuations than the other two classes with
regard to earnings, dividends, and surplus, and their price vari-
ations appear to have been greater. In collecting the data for
the industrials, two classes of errors may be expected to be larger
than in the case of the railroads and other public utilities.
These arise in the determination of surplus and earnings. The
railroads, as we have seen, being interstate carriers, are com-
pelled by the Interstate Commerce Commission to adopt uniform
methods of accounting. Such is not the case with the industrials.
They may adopt, within reasonable limits, such accounting proced-
ure as they see fit. With such latitude, it is not to be exnected
that methods will always agree, and items may be included in sur-
plus and earnings which should not rightfully be there, or left
out when they ought to be included. With regard to prices, we
must take into account the fact that the fiscal year of most of
our industrials corresponds to the calendar year, and that as a
result the Panic of 1907 will be felt in both 1907 and 1908.

national Lead Company
Taking up first for consideration National Lead, we have a
company whose graph (figure 15) does not look very much out of
the ordinary. It paid no dividends in 1904 and 1905, hut in
1906 declared a three per cent dividend, which was increased to
five per cent in 1907. In 1910 the rate was decreased to four
per cent, and again to three per cent in 1911. The earnings
upon the common stock of national Lead have not been extremely
large at any time, but they have been fairly constant, as we would
expect from such an industry as that of manufacturing paint and
other lead products. The earnings have varied from three and
one -half to six and one-half per cent. Surplus has shown a
constant increase, agreeing closely to earnings. The price of
National Lead was 20 in 1904 and 78 in 1906. We can account for
such a large rise by its increased earnings, and the speculation
resulting from a prospect of dividends to be paid in the future.
We see a marked drop in 1907, a partial recovery in 1908, and in
1909 the highest price was reached. In 1908 and 1909 the stock
paid five per cent, its high rate of dividends. During the next
two years both earnings and dividends fell, and the price went
down accordingly. In 1912 there was a slight increase in earn-
ings, and a small rise in price, followed by a drop in the next
two years.
Ameri can Car and Foundry Company
The appearance of the graph of American Car and Foundry
(figure 16) is most peculiar. A rise in earnings from two per
cent in 1905 to twenty per cent in 1907 was followed by a drop to
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two per cent in 1909, with only a partial recovery in 1910, and
again a drop to three -per cent in 1912. This is an extremely
wide fluctuation, and would be all the more remarkable if it were
not for the fact that the fiscal year of this corporation ends on
April 30, and that as a result 1907 will not include the Panic
period. In this year, although twenty per cent was earned, div-
idends of only one and one-half per cent were paid. They were
increased to three and one-half per cent in 1909 and decreased to
two per cent in 1910, which rate was maintained for the remainder
of the period. The relation of surplus to price is even more
difficult to account for than the fluctuations in earnings. Sur-
plus has increased fairly in accord to earnings from 42 up to 97.
Price has varied during the interval from 65 down to 38. It
does not seem logical that a stock which has accumulated such a
surplus should sell at so low a price. One would think that the
surplus was not a real one, and that the earnings reported did not
include charges that should be properly deducted. Price does not
seem to follow at all closely changes in the rate of earnings or
dividends. It seems to fluctuate independently of either or both.
In 1908, however, when American Car and Foundry should have felt
the Panic the most severely, the price dropped only a few joints,
as in this year earnings of twelve and one -half per cent were
reported.
Central Leather Company
Central Leather is not a stock that should appeal to the con-
servative investor. First, it is a newly organized concern, formed
in 1905 by a re-organization of the United States Leather Company.



-26-
It will be seen (figure 17) that no reports are shown prior to
1906. Second, it did not, during the period considered, declare
a dividend upon its common stock. Finally, its earnings have not
been such as to give one much confidence as to its stability.
Net earnings started with less than one per cent, rose to six and
one-half per cent in 1909, and then dropped until in 1910 a def-
icit of two per cent, shown by a negative value of the earnings
curve, was recorded. In 1911 a further drop occurred, followed
by a recovery to eight and one-half per cent in 1912. In 1913
earnings dropped to three and one-half per cent. Surplus accords
fairly closely to net earnings during the whole of the period
considered. The price of Central Leather has not fluctuated as
widely as some stocks which have earned more, and which have
declared dividends. It started at a high point of 41, and from
then has ranged around 25 to 30. Its price has not seemed to
rise or drop with either earnings or surplus.
American Smelting and Refining Company
American Smelting and Refining Company is a corporation
whose dividend rate (figure 18) rose from five per cent in 1905
to seven per cent in 1907, and then dropped to four per cent in
1909. Its earnings reached a high point of thirteen per cent in
1907, and fell to the low level of six per cent in 1911. They
have been above dividends in every year considered except 1908,
in which year they were practically coincident. The period from
1911 to 1912 included twenty months, as the fiscal year was
changed in 1912 from April 30 to December 31. Thus the sets of
Observations on this stock are only nine in number. The surplus
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of American Smelting and Refining rose in accord to earnings,
except in the year 1911. The price had a remarkable rise from
75 to 140 in 1906, and another eight point increase in 1907. In
1908 a drop to 86 occurred, which we may ascribe to the Panic,
remembering that the fiscal year of this corporation at that time
ended in April. Prom this year on the price of the stock has
fluctuated up and down, with a general downward tendency. The
price seems to rise and fall rather generally with earnings, but
does not seem to accord very closely to dividends, and not at all
to surplus.
United States Steel Corporation
In discussing the United States Steel Corporation (figure 19)
we are attempting to dismiss in a few words a corporation upon
which volumes have been written. It is our "billion dollar
trust" which evoked so much interest a few years ago. Aside from
its size and its historical interest, its graph alone is interest-
ing. It is not one of those stocks which has remained at a seem-
ingly stationary level. Its dividends, it is true, have not
varied greatly. They rose from nothing in 1905 to two per cent
in 1906, and to five per cent in 1910. It is chiefly in its
earnings and surplus that United States Steel has shown fluc-
tuation. Earnings rose from one r>er cent in 1904 to nearly six-
teen per cent in 1907, fell to four per cent in 1908, and rose
again to twelve per cent in 1910. In 1911 they were down again,
but in 1913 reached eleven per cent. Naturally with earnings
like these, since dividends have not varied to any considerable
extent, surplus must show an increasing amount, but at a very
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irregular rate. Temporary drops may be explained as differences
in accounting for earnings of subsidiary companies. It is
beyond the scope of the present discussion to inquire how much
of the surplus of United States Steel is real, and how much is
merely an absorption of water. The price of the Steel Corpora-
tion has varied widely. It started at 15 and rose rather stead-
ily until it reached a high point of 81 in 1911. It had dropped
slightly in 1907, but the high earnings of fifteen and one-half
per cent had kept the price up notwithstanding the Panic. Since
1911 it declined, and was quoted at 59 in 1913. Price and earn-
ings rose and fell with each other in some cases, but not in all.
There has been an upward trend of prices up to 1911, but a decline
after that year.
General Electric Company
General Electric (figure 20) has maintained a rate of div-
idends of eight per cent thruout all the interval considered.
Except for the period of the three years, 1907, 1908, and 1909,
earnings were from five to eight per cent above the dividends.
Only in 1908 did earnings fall below dividends. General Electric
would seem from our data to have suffered rather severely from
the Panic of 1907, and did not recover as fast as most of the other
corporations. Surplus was in accord with earnings except in
1912, when a large drop occurred. It was in this year that a
stock dividend of thirty per cent was declared. Taken over the
entire interval the price level of General Electric has fallen to
some degree and there have been rather wide fluctuations during
the interval. The highest point of 182 was reached in 1905, and
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the lowest price of 135 in 1907. The price does not seem to
have advanced or fallen consistently with either earnings or
surolus, but the heavy drop in 1913 seems tc have followed very
exactly the stock dividend of 1912.
American Sugar Refining Company
American Sugar (figure 21) resembles General Electric in
having maintained a constant dividend rate. In this case it
was, however, seven per cent instead of eight per cent. Earnings
have not shown such a margin over dividends as in the case of
the preceding corporation. In fact, during three years, 1909,
1910, and 1913, a deficit resulted. The highest earnings of any
year occurred in 1907, when twelve per cent was reported. The
wide discrepancies of surplus are not difficult to account for.
Previous to 1907 the company had not made any reports to its
stockholders, and it was not to its advantage to make the con-
dition of the corporation appear any better than was necessary.
As a result, data previous to 1907 are not comparable to later
observations. The decrease in 1908 is explained in Moody's
Manual as due to the ''Cost of a Refinery deducted from surplus.
"
The price of American Sugar has not shown nearly the fluctuation
that most of the stocks have shown. Its general trend has been,
however, downward. It does not seem to accord to the earnings
reported, and must have been greatly influenced by external
caus es
.
United States Rubber Company
United States Rubber (figure 22) until 1912 declared no
dividends upon its common stock. In that year it paid three and
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eight-tenths per cent, and later increased the rate to four and
one-half per cent. The earnings of the corporation during most
of the period have been such that more dividends might have been
declared. Earnings varied during the interval from about one-
quarter per cent up as high as nine and one -half per cent. The
company chose, however, to accumulate a larger surplus, or to
extract water from the stock, as the case may be. It had only
twenty-six per cent at the beginning of the period, but at the
end fifty three per cent was shown on the balance sheet. United
States Rubber is another stock in which a large accumulation of
surplus has not been accompanied by a high price. During 1911
and 1912, price and surplus were practically the same. The
price has, however, tended upward during the period. In 1905
it was only 26. In 1913, 59 was quoted. It will be seen that
there are two sets of data for 1913. This is due to a change
in the fiscal year of the corporation. Until 1913 the year
ended on March 31. During 1913 a change was made to December 31.
Thus the second set of data for 1913 is for the nine months from
April 1 to December 31.
Ana co nda Copper Mining Company
Anaconda Copper Mining Company (figure 23) is the last cor-
poration we have to consider. It has been one of our most widely
fluctuating stocks with regard to all four of our items. 1906
seems to have been the high point in its career. In that year
earnings, dividends, surplus, and price--all reached a maximum.
A heavy drop ensued. Dividends increased from four per cent in
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1904 to twenty-three per cent in 1906. In 1908 they fell to
eight per cent. In 1912 an increase to ten per cent was made f
and twelve per cent was declared in 1913. Earnings after 1906,
in which year they were twenty-nine per cent, have remained rather
consistently below dividends. In other words, dividends have
been declared out of surplus. The low point as far as earnings
are concerned, was reached in 1908, when only three and one -half
per cent were made. Prom then on they have increased, until
fourteen and one-half per cent were made in 1912. The next year,
however, showed a drop to ten per cent. Surplus, as we would
expect from the foregoing, has fallen since 1906. But what has
price done during this interval? It rose from 82 in 1904 to
269 in 1906--the highest of any stock we have to consider. Then
it dropped to 166 in 1908, but was up again in 1909 to 189. Since
then its trend has been downward, and in 1913 the average was
only 145. Price has gone up antf down with earnings, surplus,
and dividends, in most of the years considered.
Industrials in General
It is not possible to generalize with respect to industrials
even to the extent that we have done with regard to the railroads.
Railroads, as we have seen, are under greater regulation, their
rates are fixed for them, many of their policies are laid down to
them, and the charaoter of their business is to a great extent
similar. Industrials are widely different from each other. One
can see few points of similarity between such a conroany as the
United States Steel Corporation, and one like the General Electric
Company.
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Perhaps our industrials are no more alike in any one charac-
teristic than in the fact that all of the corporations we have
considered have been identified with the "trust movement". The
consolidation of industries led in many cases to a large increase
in the proportionate amount of stock as compared with the tangible
assets or the earning power of the new corporation. Thus some of
the companies started out with an actual deficit, but not one that
was shown on the books of account. The accumulation of a surplus,
as it was called, was as a matter of fact merely a gradual extinc-
tion of this deficit. As a result we see large book surpluses,
and at the same time low prices.
With regard to earnings, dividends, and prices, we can say
little. All three factors have fluctuated widely both in the
several corporations, and also within each corporation. The
prices of two have tended upward, two have remained practically
stationary, and five have gone down. Perhaps we can say that as
a class, the price of the industrials shows a less intimate re-
lationship to the earnings and dividends than in the case of the
other two classes.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
We have briefly considered the stocks of each of the three
groups - -rai lroads , other public utilities, and industrials. We
have pointed out a few of the most salient features of each stock.
We have attempted to explain the most remarkable fluctuations as
to surplus, earnings, dividends, and prices. We have tried to
account for such discrepancies as were noted. These, as we have
seen, have occurred principally in the items of surplus and earn-
ings, which, as before noted, are susceptible to errors in obser-
vation and in accounting principles. We have traced the cases in
which the price seems to accord to dividends, earnings, and sur-
plus, and those instances in which it does not seem to follow them.
Finally we have generalized to some extent the stocks of the three
groups
.
We may summarize our conclusions from these observations as
follows:
First, it has been practically impossible with the means at
our disposal, to eliminate altogether the effect of the external
causes, and of those internal causes which we did not wish to con-
sider. We can note such important factors as the Panic of 1907,
but we must not suppose that other factors have not been at work.
At no time can we say that the price has not been influenced by
outside causes. They may not be as noticeable in their effects,
but nevertheless they are" ever-present . Furthermore, we must
remember that human nature will cause us to seek those causes which
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we hope to find, and to neglect those which do not fall in with
our foregone conclusions. Thus we will look for an explanation
of a drop in price where we would naturally expect a rise, but
we may not ask about the cause of a twenty per cent rise when we
would be led to anticipate only a ten per cent increase in r»rice.
Again, we are compelled to admit that in a discussion of
this kind, covering as it does, only twenty-three stocks, for a
period of ten years, at a time when we are not able to say with
any degree of accuracy what have been the external causes, and
how they have worked, we are not able to draw any very valid con-
clusions. The present paper may be a good nucleus for a more
exhaustive treatment of the subject, one that will embrace a larger
number of stocks, for a longer term of years, and will attempt to
investigate more thoroughly such considerations as the rate of
interest in the country, the general condition of the money market,
and the country's condition as regards trade, both domestic and
foreign. However, we need not say that the oresent investigation
has been altogether unproductive of results. The number of
stocks considered is sufficiently large, and the term of years is
long enough, that we can at least arrive at some conclusions which
the general tendencies as shown by the stocks may be said to .jus-
tify.
Third, we must not assume that an increase in the amount of
surplus will necessaril;/ increase the price of a stock to the same
extent. One might very naturally assume that the creation of a
surplus of twenty-five per cent in a corporation whose stock would
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normally sell at 100, would increase its price to 125. This
conclusion would seem from our observations to be unjustified.
Neither can surplus be said to exert any great influence upon
steadying the price of a stock. That surplus does not exert a
greater effect upon the price is probably due to the following
facts:
1. Buyers do not purchase a stock to realize upon the sale
of its assets, but for what it is worth as a going concern.
2. In many cases surplus is not real, but is either made
up to a great degree of items which should properly be charges
against profit and loss, though reported as appropriations of
profit, or else is a gradual extinction of a portion of the water
that has been infused into the stock.
3. Stock-buyers do not read balance sheets to any consider-
able extent, and if they do, they have no great degree of confi-
dence in the statement submitted by the corporation.
Our railroads and other public utilities exhibit a surplus
that is in closer accord to price than that of the industrials.
This, as pointed out above, may be because of the greater amount
of stock-watering in the case of the industrials.
Fourth, in most cases the price fluctuations follow changes
in earnings closer than they do either dividends or surplus, but
the changes are not directly proportional to each other. To
explain, we would expect about a fifteen per cent rise in orice
with a one per cent rise in earnings, if we capitalize earnings
at about six and one-half per cent. But a rise of this size does
not usually occur. Part of this we may explain as the effect of
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external causes. Part we may explain by saying that it is the
belief of investors and speculators that the earnings will not be
maintained at the new level.
Fifth, the price does not respond as quickly to a change in
the dividend rate, when unaccompanied by a change in the rate of
earnings, as we might expect. A general change in the rate of
dividends; that is, a change in the level of dividends maintained,
seems, however, to affect the general level of the price.
Sixth, we must conclude that price fluctuations have been
more severe during the period than one might have been lead to
expect, and that these fluctuations occur in the conservative
stocks as well as in the more speculative. Of course our obser-
vations include years of extreme speculation, a period of finan-
cial panic, and a time of general rising prices. But these ex-
ternal conditions do not justify such a wide range of rcrice fluc-
tuations. They make us think that none of the common stocks in
the list selected can be recommended to the investor as a safe
place to put his money.
Finally, if we are to combine our conclusions, we shall see
the relative potency of surplus, earnings, and dividends as re-
gards price fluctuations, and price levels. Earnings are the
most potent factor in producing immediate fluctuations of price.
Surplus, while it arises directly from earnings, does not seem to
have the effect that one might very naturally anticipate. In fact,
it appears to exercise very little influence, if any, upon the
price of the stock, or upon its fluctuations. neither does it
seem to have an appreciable effect upon making these fluctuations
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less. Dividends, while they do not have such an effect as earn-
ings upon immediate changes in price, appear to exercise the
greatest effect upon the level of prices of a stock.
At the last analysis, an investor values a stock for the
return it yields him. If earnings rise, he figures that in a
short time he will get higher returns, and therefore he will pay
a higher price for the stock. If the rate of dividends goes up,
his judgment is affirmed, and the price will remain at a level
above that at which he bought it. If dividends, do not rise, his
judgment has been faulty, and the price will drop from the level
at which he purchased.
In estimating the value of bonds we do not have such a dif-
ference between earnings and dividends. In this case earnings
are dividends, and are not subject to fluctuation. To a lesser
degree is this true of preferred stocks. Here both earnings and
dividends coincide, but are variable. They have a fixed maximum,
but no definite minimum. Common stocks, on the contrary, have
neither a fixed maximum nor a minimum. neither do earnings and
dividends coincide. It is only in case that the deviations of
earnings from dividends approach zero that earning power can be
used as a basis for valuing a common stock. Earnings influence
prices in so far as they influence the probability of changes in
the dividend rate. Obviously, it is not good policy for a cor-
poration to maintain a rate of dividends of six per cent when earn-
ings are not more than five per cent. Such a policy will in time
be destructive, and the corporation will be compelled eventually
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to reduce dividends, or pass them altogether. On the contrary,
if a corporation has a board of directors which believes in put-
ting all earnings above a certain amount to surplus, the invest-
or is not likely to receive a higher rate of return at an early
date. The idea that sometime in the dim future the stock may
pay a much higher rate of return because of a low rate now, does
not appeal to the investor in the same way that a small present
increase does. Surplus is only earnings that have been allowed
to accumulate in order that eventually the stock may earn more.
But we have seen that the accumulation of a surplus does not
appear to cause a rise in the price of a stock.
However, the dividends of the ordinary corporation must be
in close correspondence to its earnings. Very few boards of
directors can withstand the clamorings of stockholders for div-
idends when earnings justify them. Neither can they keep up
a dividend rate which earnings do not warrant. Thus it is that
earnings must bear a very close relation to dividends or to the
probability of dividends. If a bondholder is assured of the
payment of the interest and of the principal when it comes due,
it is of small moment to him whether the corporation earns fifteen
per cent on its stock, or only ten per cent. So if the holders
of two common stocks were sure that both stocks would always pay
six per cent dividends, that in neither would a stock dividend
be declared, that neither business would be wound up, they would
value the two stocks at approximately the same urice, even though
one earned only six per cent and the other twelve per cent. This
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is only another way of saying that dividends are what the investor
is looking for, not earnings. When common stocks reach such a
stahility of dividends as have bonds of interest rates, then we
may capitalize them upon some logical basis. But that "basis
will he the basis of earnings paid over to the stockholder; that
is, dividends, not of earnings made by the corporation.



